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1 Introduction
Suppose you’re on a game show, and you’re given the choice of three
doors: Behind one door is a car; behind the others, goats. You pick
a door, say No. 1, and the host, who knows what’s behind the doors,
opens another door, say No. 3, which has a goat. He then says to you,
“Do you want to pick door No. 2?” Is it to your advantage to switch
your choice?
With these famous words the Parade Magazine columnist vos Savant opened
an exciting chapter in mathematical didactics. The puzzle, which has be-
come known as the Monty Hall Problem (MHP), has broken the records of
popularity among the probability paradoxes. The book by Rosenhouse [9]
and the Wikipedia entry on the MHP present the history and variations of
the problem.
In the basic version of the MHP the rules of the game specify that the
host must always reveal one of the unchosen doors to show that there is no
prize there. Two remaining unrevealed doors may hide the prize, creating the
illusion of symmetry and suggesting that the action does not matter. How-
ever, the symmetry is fallacious, and switching is a better action, doubling
the probability of winning.
There are two main explanations of the paradox. One of them, simplistic,
amounts to just counting the mutually exclusive cases: either you win with
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switching or with holding the first choice. A more sophisticated argument,
included in the textbooks as an exercise on the Bayes theorem, calculates the
conditional probability of winning in the situation described in vos Savant’s
wording of the problem.
In [6] a critical analysis of the conventional approaches to the MHP has
been done, with the advocated viewpoint that the whole situation of making
decision, viewed as a multistep process, is a challenging instance of math-
ematical modelling, very much amenable to the analysis within the game-
theoretic framework. The textbook by Haggstro¨m [8] puts the zero-sum game
in matrix form and presents a minimax solution. Further steps in this direc-
tion were done in [3] and [4], where it was argued that the game-theoretic
concept of dominance allows to analyse the problem under fairly general
assumptions on the prior information of the decision-maker, including the
very interesting case of nouniform distribution, only occasionally included in
exercise sections of probability textbooks [7, 11].
One elementary new observation we make is that for every contestant’s
strategy of playing the game after the initial door has been chosen, there is
always (at least) one ‘unlucky’ door, the same for every admissible algorithm
for revealing the doors by the host. The prize is never found behind the ‘un-
lucky’ door, hence the contestant will always lose in at least one case out of
three. This leads, rather straightforwardly, to the worst-case winning proba-
bility 2/3. We prefer, however, for the sake of instruction and in anticipation
of future generalizations to give here a full Bayesian analysis, with the host
biased in any possible way.
These notes, expanding upon the cited literature are intended to show
that the MHP is indeed an excellent occasion to expose the undergraduate
students to basic ideas of the game theory and to decision-making under
various uncertainty scenarios. Due to its remarkable symmetry features the
zero-sum version of the game will undoubtedly enter the Hall of Fame of the
classical games like matching pennies and paper-scissors-stone.
2 The MHP as a sequential decision process
The game involves two actors which we christen Monte and Conie. In the
basic scenario to follow, the prize is hidden behind one of three doors by
Monte, then Conie picks a door which is kept unrevealed, then one of the
unchosen doors is revealed as not containing the prize, and then an offer is
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made to switch the choice from the initial guess to another unrevealed door.
Conie wants the prize and she wins it if her final choice falls on the door
where the prize was hidden.
To state the rules more rigorously and to introduce some notation for
the admissible actions we number the doors 1,2,3. The game consists of four
moves:
(i) Monte chooses a door number θ from doors 1,2,3 to hide the prize. He
keeps θ in secret.
(ii) Conie picks door number x out of 1,2,3. Monte observes Conie’s choice.
(iii) Monte reveals a door distinct from x as not hiding the prize, and of-
fers to Conie the possibility of choosing between door x and another
unrevealed door y.
(iv) Conie finally chooses door z from doors x and y. Conie wins the prize
if z = θ, otherwise she wins nothing.
Conie’s ignorance about the location of the prize means in the mathemat-
ical language that her actions cannot depend on θ explicitly. There is also
another, more subtle, indefinite factor of which Conie is ignorant: this is the
way Monte chooses between two doors to reveal in the case x = θ. These
two indefinite factors, which are under the control of her opponent, comprise
Conie’s decision-making environment.
We say that there is a match if θ = x, in which case y on step (iii) can be
one of two numbers distinct from θ; whereas if there is a mismatch, θ 6= x,
the rules force y = θ. On step (iv), we say that Conie takes action ‘hold’
(of sticking with the initial choice), denoted h, if z = x; and that she takes
action ‘switch’ (from the initial choice), denoted s, if z = y.
To illustrate, a sequence of admissible moves θ, x, y, z could be 2212,
which means that Monte hides the prize behind door 2, Conie picks door 2
(so there is a match), then Monte offers to switch to door 1 (by revealing
door 3 as not containing the prize), and finally Conie plays h by sticking with
her initial choice 2. Since z = θ Conie wins the prize.
Positions in the game represent all substantial information available for
the move to follow. These are represented by vertices in the game tree in
Figure 1. An edge connects a position to another position achievable in one
move. The play starts at the root vertex with Monte’s move leading to a
3
position θ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then the moves of actors alternate. A path in the
tree from the root to a terminal vertex is determined by the actions of both
actors. Each path directed away from the root ends in a leaf node, with
Conie’s winning positions (θ, x, y, z) being those with z = θ.
There is one important feature of the game which we indicate by color-
ing positions in the figure. Conie does not know the winning door θ. The
information of Conie on her second move can be specified by partitioning
the collection of relevant positions in information sets. For the first Conie’s
move x there is just one information set {1, 2, 3}. On her second move, Conie
cannot distinguish e.g. between positions 121 and 221, since for x = 2 and
y = 1 (when the revealed door is 3) the prize can be behind any of the doors
1 and 2; thus {121, 221} is one information set which we denote ∗21, with ∗
staying for the unknown admissible value of θ (1 or 2 in this case).
The complete list of information sets for the second Conie’s move is
∗12, ∗13, ∗21, ∗23, ∗31, ∗32. Possible moves are labelled by actions {h, s},
and the action depends on the set. Thus if the action is h from position
112, then it must be h from position 212. The game tree with partition of
positions into information sets is sometimes called the Kuhn tree.
Monte always knows the current position in the game exactly, so his
information sets are singletons.
3 Strategies and the payoff matrix
A strategy of Monte is a rule which for each position, where Monte is on
the move, specifies a follower exactly. For his first move from the starting
position a strategy specifies a value of θ. For his second move a strategy
specifies the value of y for each position (θ, x), so we can consider y as a
function y = dθ(x), where
dθ(x) = θ if x 6= θ,
dθ(x) 6= θ if θ = x.
Simply put, Monte’s strategy can be encoded in a pair of door numbers like
12, where θ = 1 is the door hiding the prize, and d1(1) = 2 is the door to
which the switch is offered in the case of match. This indeed determines the
function d1(·) uniquely because d1(2) = d1(3) = 1. With this notation, the
complete list of Monte’s strategies is
4
start
1
11
112
1121 àh
1122s
113
1131 àh
1133s
12 121
1211 às
1212h
13 131
1311 às
1313h
2
21 212
2121h
2122 às
22
221
2211s
2212 àh
223
2232 àh
2233s
23 232
2322 às
2323h
3
31 313
3131h
3133 às
32 323
3232h
3233 às
33
331
3311s
3313 àh
332
3322s
3323 àh
Figure 1: The game tree with succession of moves θ, x, y, z, and Conie’s
winning terminal positions marked à.
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M = {12, 13, 21, 22, 31, 32}.
A strategy of Conie is a rule which for each position where Conie is on the
move specifies a follower, in a way consistent with partition in information
sets. Thus, her strategy must specify the value of x. Furthermore, for each
initial choice x and the door offered for switch y 6= x her strategy must
specify an action from the set {h, s}, which is a function ax(·), so that the
second Conie’s move is
z = x if ax(y) = h,
z = y if ax(y) = s.
When x is fixed ax(y) must be specified for two possible values of y. We
can write therefore Conie’s strategy as a triple like 2sh which specifies x = 2
and a2(1) = s, a2(3) = h. The second entry s of 2sh encodes the action
for smaller door number y, and the third entry h for larger. With similar
conventions, the complete list of twelve strategies of Conie is
C = {1ss, 1sh, 1hs, 1hh, 2ss, 2sh, 2hs, 2hh, 3ss, 3sh, 3hs, 3hh}.
Every strategy of the kind xhh or xss will be called constant-action strategy,
and every strategy of the kind xss will be called always-switching stratgey.
Strategies xsh and xhs are context-dependent strategies.
A strategy profile of the actors is a strategy of Monte and a strategy of
Conie. When a strategy profile is fixed, the course of the game, represented
by a path in the game tree, is fully inambiguous. For instance, when the
profile (12,2sh) is played by the actors, θ, x, y, z is 1211, because Monte
offers a switch to door 1, and since 1 is the smaller door number of possible
values of y ∈ {1, 3} Conie reacts with s, hence winning the prize. The second
entry 2 of Monte’s strategy 12 is immaterial for this outcome since there is a
mismatch θ 6= x. We adopt the convention that Conie receives payoff 1 when
she wins the prize and 0 otherwise. The matrix C in Figure 2 represents the
correspondence between the strategy profiles and Conie’s payoffs.
Unlike the game tree, the simplified matrix representation ignores many
substantial attributes like moves, positions and information sets. The game
in this matrix form amounts to a very simple procedure: Monte picks a
column and Conie picks a row of matrix C. Conie’s payoff is then the entry
of C that stays on the intersection of the selected row and column.
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θ, y = 12 13 21 23 31 32
1ss 0 0 1 1 1 1
1hs 1 0 0 0 1 1
1sh 0 1 1 1 0 0
1hh 1 1 0 0 0 0
2ss 1 1 0 0 1 1
2hs 0 0 1 0 1 1
2sh 1 1 0 1 0 0
2hh 0 0 1 1 0 0
3ss 1 1 1 1 0 0
3hs 0 0 1 1 1 0
3sh 1 1 0 0 0 1
3hh 0 0 0 0 1 1
Figure 2: Conie’s payoff matrix C
An advantage of the matrix representation is that it unifies and simplifies
the analysis. In particular, we can compare different Conie’s strategies under
different assumptions on the decision-making environments, that is Monte’s
behaviors. For instance, we can think of two Conies which simultaneously
play, say, 1hs and 3ss (respectively) against the same strategy of Monte.
Note that ‘simultaneous’ in this context refers to a logical comparison of the
outcomes, rather than to a real play.
A quick inspection of the matrixC shows that the problem has a property
called weak dominance:
for every Conie’s strategy A which in some situation employs action h
(so A is of the kind xhh, xhs or xsh) there exists an always-switching
strategy B such that if A wins against S, then B wins against S as
well, whichever strategy of Monte S.
For instance, strategy 1hs which does not switch to door y = 2, is dominated
by always-switching strategy 2ss. Amazingly, 1hs is beaten in the situation
θ = 1, y = 3 where the strategy uses the switch action! The never-switching
strategy 1hh is dominated by both 2ss and 3ss. The dominance is a very
strong argument for excluding the strategies which may employ the action h.
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The dominance feature has a nice interpretation in terms of ‘unlucky’
door. Suppose for a time-being that the prize-hiding is a move of nature (or
quiz-team), out of control of Monte. All Monte can do is to choose door y to
reveal when he can.
The ‘unlucky’ door theorem says: whichever Conie’s strategy A, there
exists a door u (depending on A) such that under A the final choice
z does not fall on u when θ = u, whichever Monte’s way of revealing
doors when he can. Strategy uss then weakly dominates A.
Door u = u(A) is marked in C by two zeroes in positions u∗ of the row
A, for instance u = 2 for A = 1hs, and u = 2 or 3 for A = 1hh.
So the existence of the ‘unlucky’ door means that Conie never wins for
θ = u, no matter how Monty reveals the doors. Therefore,
If θ is chosen uniformly at random Conie’s winning probability cannot
exceed 2/3.
4 The Bayesian games
We described above the sets of pure strategiesM and C, selecting from which
a particular profile determines inambiguously a succession of moves. A mixed
strategy of an actor is an assignment of probability to each pure strategy of
the actor. Playing mixed strategies means using chance devices to choose
fromM and C. A mixed strategy of Monte can be written as a row vector Q
with six components corresponding to her pure strategies. A mixed strategy
of Conie can be written as a row vector P of length twelve.
Conie’s generic mixed strategy has 11 parameters, as probabilities add to
one. A general theorem due to Kuhn says that if the actors do not forget
their private history (perfect recall), like in our game, it is enough to consider
a smaller class of behavioral strategies. A behavioral strategy specifies prob-
ability distribution on the set of admissible moves for every information set
of an actor. Thus behavioral strategy of Conie is described by 8 parameters,
2 numbers for distribution of x and 6 biases for coins tossed for each infor-
mation set. This subtle distinction of the general and behavioral strategies is
only mentioned here for the sake of instruction, but the distinction becomes
important in some games where an actor may forget some elements of her
private history.
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The support of a mixed strategies are the pure strategies with nonzero
probability. For instance, the support of (. . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . ) is one pure strat-
egy, thus we simply identify pure strategies with mixed strategies of this kind.
This identification allows us to view a mixed strategy as a convex combina-
tion (also called mixture) of the pure strategies constituting the support. A
mixed strategy P (respectively Q) is called fully supported if the support is
C (respectively M).
When strategy profile (P ,Q) is played by the actors, the expected payoff
for Conie, equal to her probability of winning the prize, is computed by the
matrix multiplication as PCQT , where T denotes transposition. This way of
computation presumes that the actors’ choices of pure strategies are indepen-
dent random variables with values in M and C (respectively), which may be
simulated by the actors’ private randomization devices. The independence
of individual strategies is a feature required by the idea of noncooperative
game, in which there is no communication of actors to play a joint strategy.
In the Bayesian setting of the decision problem Monte is supposed to play
some fixed strategy Q, known to Conie. The probability textbooks consider
the Bayesian setting for the MHP, withQ being the uniform distribution over
M, which is equivalent to the assumption that Monte picks θ from {1, 2, 3}
by rolling a three-sided die, and in the event of match picks a door y from
two possibilities by tossing a fair coin. The general Bayesian formulation,
which may be called a game against the nature, models the situation where
Conie deals with unconcious random algorithm which neither has own goals
nor can take advantage of Conie’s mistakes. Conie’s optimal behavior is then
a Bayesian strategy P ′ = P ′(Q) which maximizes the probability of winning
the prize:
P ′CQT = max
P
PCQT .
Bayesian strategy always exists by continuity of PCQT as function of P ,
and compactness of the set of mixed strategies. Moreover, by linearity of
PCQT and convexity
The general Bayesian strategy is an arbitrary mixture of the pure
Bayesian strategies.
Now suppose Q is fully supported, that is every pure strategy from M
is played with positive probability, and let A and B be two distinct pure
strategies of Conie such that B weakly dominates A. Since all rows of C are
distinct the latter means that the collection of columns in which row A has
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a 1 is a proper subset of the collection of columns in which B has a 1. But
then the winning probability is strictly larger for B than for A. Since every
strategy admitting action h is weakly dominated by some always-switching
strategy we conclude that
If Q is fully supported then only always-switching pure strategies can
be Bayesian, hence every Bayesian strategy is a mixture of always-
switching strategies.
Thus in the ‘generic’ case the Bayesian principle of optimality excludes strate-
gies which may use h. Having retained only always-switching strategies, it is
easy to find all Bayesian strategies explicitly.
Suppose that according to fully supportedQ the probability to hide the
prize behind door θ ∈ {1, 2, 3} is piθ. Let pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ pi3 > 0 (otherwise
re-label the doors). Then the only pure Bayesian strategies are
(1) 3ss if pi1 ≥ pi2 > pi3,
(2) 2ss and 3ss if pi1 > pi2 = pi3,
(3) 1ss, 2ss and 3ss if pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 1/3.
If Q is not fully supported then the listed always-switching strategies are
still Bayesian, but some other strategies may be Bayesian too. For instance, a
never-switching strategy xhh is Bayesian if (and only if) Monte always hides
the prize behind door x, although even then every always-switching strategy
x′ss with x′ 6= x is Bayesian also.
More interestingly, suppose Q = (1/3, 0, 1/3, 0, 1/3, 0). This is a model
for a ‘crawl’ behavior of the host [10], who is eager to reveal the door with
higher number when he has a choice. In this case the Bayesian pure strategies
are 1ss, 2ss, 3ss and 1hs, 2hs, 3hs. In general, the rule to determine
all Bayesian pure strategies by excluding the dominated strategies is the
following:
If strategy θ, y with y = min{1, 2, 3} \ {θ} enters Q with nonzero prob-
ability then θsh is not Bayesian.
If strategy θ, y with y = max{1, 2, 3} \ {x} enters Q with nonzero
probability then θhs is not Bayesian.
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For arbitrary Q Conie’s strategy ‘point at the door which is the least
likely to hide the prize, then always switch’ is Bayesian, giving the probability
of win 1 − minθ piθ, where piθ is the probability of θ = 1, 2, 3. Remarkably,
all what Conie needs to know to play optimally in a Bayesian game is the
number of the least likely door. She tips at this door and switches all the
time, winning the complementary probability no matter which are the biases
for revealing the doors in case of match.
In the special case pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 1/3 every always-switching strategy is
Bayesian no matter how y is chosen in the event of match x = θ; a conclusion
usually shown in the literature with the help of conditional probabilities.
In fact, for an optimal choice of x, the conditional probability of winning
with switching in every position xy is at least 1/2. This is implied by the
overall optimality (in the Bayesian sense), and is a simple instance of the
general Bellman’s dynamic programming principle.
5 The zero-sum game
The zero-sum game is a model for interaction of actors with antagonistic
goals. Conie wins the prize when Monte loses it. The essense of the zero-
sum game is the worst-case analysis. What Conie can guarantee in the game,
when the behavior of Monte can be arbitrary (but agreeing with the game
rules)? What is the worst behavior of Monte?
We can write Monte’s payoffs as another 12 × 6 matrix M , but this is
not necessary as M = −C, so C contains all information about the payoffs.
In this context, when Monty plays Q, Conies’ Bayesian strategy P ′ =
P ′(Q) is called a best response to Q. Reciprocally, when Conie plays a
particular P Monte’s best response strategy Q′ = Q′(P ) is the one for
which Conie’s winning probability is minimal,
PCQ′T = min
P
PCQT .
A profile of actors’ mixed strategies (P ∗,Q∗) is said to be a minimax
solution (or saddle point) if the strategies are the best responses to each
other,
P ∗CQ∗T = max
P
PCQ∗T = min
Q
P ∗CQT .
Such a solution exists for arbitrary matrix game with finite sets of strategies,
by the minimax theorem due to von Neumann. The number V := P ∗CQ∗T
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is called the value of the game, and it does not depend on particular minimax
profile due to the fundamental relation
V = max
P
min
Q
PCQT = min
Q
max
P
PCQT
involved in the minimax theorem.
Strategy P ∗ of Conie is minimax if it guarantees the winning probability
at least V no matter what Monte does. Strategy Q∗ of Monte is minimax if
it incures the winning probability at most V no matter what Conie does.
Recalling our discussion around the dominance it is really easy to see that
V = 2/3. If Monte chooses θ uniformly at random, Conie cannot winning
probability higher than 2/3. On the other hand, if x is chosen uniformly
at random and xss is played, Conie guarantees 2/3 no matter what Monte
does. So a solution is found.
We wish to approach the solution more formally, manipulaing the payoff
matrix. The principle of the elimination of dominated strategies says:
the value of the game is not altered if the game matrix is (repeatedly)
reduced by eliminating a (weakly) dominated row or column.
Explicitly, strategy 1ss dominates 2hs and 2hh
1ss 0 0 1 1 1 1
2hs 0 0 1 0 1 1
2hh 0 0 1 1 0 0
and 3ss dominates 2sh
3ss 1 1 1 1 0 0
2sh 1 1 0 1 0 0
Continuing the elimination we reduce to
1ss 0 0 1 1 1 1
2ss 1 1 0 0 1 1
3ss 1 1 1 1 0 0
Finally, discarding repeated columns the matrix is reduced to the square
matrix c:
12
θ, y = 12 21 32
1ss 0 1 1
2ss 1 0 1
3ss 1 1 0
The reduced game c has a clear interpretation. Monte and Conie choose
door numbers θ and x, respectively, from {1, 2, 3}. If the choices mismatch
(θ 6= x) Conie wins, otherwise there is no payoff.
Let us find an equalizing strategy p∗ for which p∗cqT is the same no
matter which counter-strategy q Monte plays. Taking for q pure strategies
we arrive at the system of equations
p2 + p3 = p1 + p2 = p1 + p3,
which taken together with p1 + p2 + p3 = 1 is complete. Solving the system
we see that with p∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) Conie wins with probability 2/3 no
matter what Monte does. Similarly, when Monte plays q∗ = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
the winning probability is always 2/3 no matter what Conie does. Thus
(p∗, q∗) is a solution of the game and the value V = 2/3 is confirmed.
Yet another way to arrive at (p∗, q∗) is to use symmetry of matrix c
induced by permutations of the door numbers (see [2], Theorem 3.4).
A related game with diagonal matrix

 −1 0 00 −1 0
0 0 −1


is obtained by subtracting a constant matrix from c. In this diagonal game
Monte wins if the choices match, otherwise there is no payoff.
Going back to the original matrix C, we conclude that the profile
P ∗ =
(
1
3
, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0
)
, Q∗
1,1,1 =
(
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0
)
is a solution to the game. Strategy P ∗ is equalizing, as P ∗CQ =2/3 for all
Q. According to the solution (P ∗,Q∗
1,1,1) Monte plays the ‘crawl’ strategy:
he hides the prize uniformly at random, and he always reveals the door with
higher number, when there is a freedom for the second action. Conie selects
door x uniformly at random and always plays s.
13
The generic Monte’s strategy assigning probability 1/3 to every value of
θ is of the form
Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 =
(
λ1
3
,
1− λ1
3
,
λ2
3
,
1− λ2
3
,
λ3
3
,
1− λ3
3
)
where 0 ≤ λθ ≤ 1, θ ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Parameter λθ is the conditional probabil-
ity that Monte will offer switching to door with smaller number in the case
of match. If Conie plays best response to Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 she wins with probabil-
ity 2/3, as we have seen when considering the Bayesian setting. Therefore
each strategy Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 is minimax. On the other hand, if the values of θ
have probabilities piθ a best response of Conie yields winning probability
1−min(pi1, pi2, pi3), which is minimized for pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 1/3. We see that
The strategies Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 and only they are the minimax strategies of
Monte.
Furthermore, if Q∗λ1,λ2,λ3 is fully supported, which is the case when λθ ∈
(0, 1) for θ ∈ {1, 2, 3}, then the unique best response is P ∗, thus
Conie’s strategy P ∗ of choosing a door uniformly at random, then
always switching is the unique minimax strategy.
The subclass of Monte’s strategies with the second action independent of
the first given match consists of strategies with equal probabilities λ1 = λ2 =
λ3; these were discussed e.g. in [9] (Version Five of the MHP).
We note that the general theory does not preclude weakly dominated
strategies from being minimax (see [2], Section 2.6, Exercise 9). This does
not occur in the MHP because there exist fully supported minimax strategies
of Monte.
6 The general-sum games
The logical way to go beyond the zero-sum game is a non-zero sum game. In
such model there is a 12×6 payoff matrix of Monte M which need not be the
negative of C. A best response to Monte’s strategy Q is defined as before,
but best response to Conie’s strategy P is now a strategy which maximizes
the expected payoff PMQT .
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A central solution concept for the general-sum game game is a Nash
equilibrium, defined as a profile of mixed strategies (P ′,Q′) which are best
responses to each other,
P ′CQ′T = max
P
PCQ′T and P ′MQ′T = max
Q
P ′MQT .
That is to say, Nash equilibrium is a profile (P ′,Q′) such that a unilateral
change of the strategy by one of the actors cannot improve the private payoff
of the actor. A general theorem due to John Nash ensures that at least one
such Nash equilibrium exists.
Nash equilibrium is a concept of noncooperative game theory. The play-
ers cannot make binding agreements on a joint choice of strategy unless the
agreements are self-enforced. This is formalized by the independence pre-
sumed in the product formulas for computing the payoffs.
In every Nash equilibrium Conie will have winning probability not less
than her minimax value V = 2/3, which is her safety level. Higher proba-
bility in some Nash equilibria might be possible, since the game is no longer
antagonistic.
Our analysis of the Bayesian strategies can be applied to the general-sum
games as well. Suppose in a Nash equilibrium (P ′,Q′) strategy Q′ is fully
supported. Then P ′, being a best response to Q′, is a mixture of always-
switching strategies. Let pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ pi3 > 0 be probabilities of the values
θ = 1, 2, 3 under Q′. Then we have
A profile (P ′,Q′) is a Nash equilibrium with fully supported Q′ if and
only if there exists a probability vector (p1, p2, p3) such that the mixture
with weights p1, p2, p3 of rows 1ss, 2ss, 3ss of matrix M is a row vector
with equal entries. There are three possibilities
(1) p3 = 1, pi2 > pi3 and the row 3ss of M is a constant row,
(2) p1 = 0, pi1 > pi2 = pi3 and a mixture of the rows 2ss and 3ss of
M is a constant row,
(3) p1p2p3 > 0, pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = 1/3, and the arithmetical average of
rows 1ss, 2ss and 3ss of M is a constant row
In the case (3) Conie’s winning probability is her safety level 2/3 but, un-
like the zero-sum game, the equilibrium strategy P ′ need not give the same
probability to every always-switching strategy. Thus if the equilibrium has
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a property of nondegeneracy, when every pure strategy of Monte and every
always-switching strategy of Conie is played with positive probability, then
for Conie the game brings the same as the game against antagonistic Monte.
If none of the mixtures of the xss-rows is constant, there is no fully
supported Nash equilibrium.
What could be plausible assumptions on Monte’s payoff M? If Monte is
only concerned about the fate of the prize, and not where and how the prize
is won, his essentially distinct payoff structures are M = −C (antagonistic
Monte) M = C (sympathetic Monte) and M = 0 (indifferent Monte). The
first case is zero-sum, in the second case every entry 1 of C corresponds
to a pure Nash equilibrium, and in the third case every pair (Q,P ′) with
best-response P ′ = P ′(Q) is a Nash equilibrium.
It is not hard to design further exotic examples of payoffs M for which
context-dependent strategies enter some Nash equilibrium profile.
If there is a moral of that it is perhaps this: context-dependent strategies
may be a rational kind of behavior under certain intensions of Monte. The
source for this phenomenon is twofold. Firstly, this is the very idea of equilib-
rium: if Conie steps away from the context-dependent equilibrium strategy,
Monty is not forced to play old strategy and may change biases in a way
unfavorable for Conie, typically pushing her down to the safety level 2/3.
Secondly, the domination is only weak, thus can have no effect if support
is not full. However, such context-dependent equilibria are highly unstable,
and minor perturbations of M will destroy them. Practically speaking, if
Conie has any doubts about Monte’s intensions it is safe to stay with always-
switching strategies.
As for the famous question, the noncooperative game theory gives more
weight to vos Savant’s solution by adding
Yes, you should switch. You knew the rules of the game. If your deci-
sion were to pick door 1 and hold when a switch to door 2 offered, then
I could beat your strategy by picking door 2 and switching whichever
happens. My strategy will be even strictly better than yours if the prize
can ever be hidden behind door 2.
If the game is cooperative, for instance if Monte and Conie want happily
drive their new cadillac to Nice, they could just favor door 1. But this is a
completely different story.
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